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Abstract 
 
In this study, we investigate the role of development assistance in reducing a hypothetically 
negative impact of terrorism on economic growth, using a panel of  78 developing nations 
with data for the period 1984-2008. The empirical evidence is based on interactive Quantile 
regressions. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics are employed while 
development assistance measurements comprised: bilateral and multilateral aid variables. 
With regard to the investigated hypothesis, we consistently confirm that: (i) In quantiles 
where terrorism is found to increase (decrease) economic growth, its interaction with foreign 
aid decreases (increases) economic growth. (ii) Comparing thresholds of the modifying aid 
variables for which the hypothesis is either rejected or accepted reveals that higher levels of 
multilateral (bilateral) aid are needed to reverse the negative effect of total (unclear) terrorism 
on growth, than  the quantity needed to reverse the positive impact of transnational (domestic 
and total) terrorism(s) on growth. (iii) There is scant evidence of positive net effects. Overall 
the findings broadly indicate that foreign aid is a necessary but not a sufficient policy tool for 
completely dampening the effects of terrorism on economic growth.  
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1. Introduction  
 An April 2015 publication by the World Bank of World Development Indicators has 
raised renewed interest in policy-making and academic circles (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2017a). The account maintains that more than 45 percent of Sub-Saharan (SSA) African 
countries were off-track from achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extreme 
poverty target (Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 2015).  
The growth that was needed to mitigate poverty at the end of the MDG year was 
shown to be considerably influenced by political violence and terrorism activities. Consistent 
with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a), countries that have witnessed the Arab Spring have 
also seen their growth levels plummet, a tendency that is being accompanied with poverty 
externalities. We may therefore surmise that people who live in a politico-economic 
environment that is plagued by terrorism have limited access to essential services which are 
needed to promote growth and wellbeing within an economy. This trend is more rampant in 
nations that are just emerging from political instability and war. This is primarily because 
threats of potential terrorism often translate into an economic outlook that is shrouded in 
uncertainty, owing to a growing concern among both domestic and foreign investors (Kelsey 
& le Roux, 2017, 2018). Fundamentally, the impacts of terrorism may be long-lasting 
involving considerable negative externalities on economic prosperity. Such may include,  
inter alia: higher insurance premium, growing cost of investment, decreasing economic 
output, as well as savings and infrastructural damages (Singh, 2001, 2007; Efobi et al., 2015).  
Drawing from the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13), terrorism at the 
global level has been burgeoning since the 2011 Arab Spring. Firstly, post-Gaddafi Libya has 
become a failed state, with total anarchy, various rebel factions dictating the law of the land 
and two rival domestic governments claiming control over the economy. Secondly, the 
situation in Yemen has considerably deteriorated, with a proxy war being fought since early 
2015 by Saudi Arabia and Iran supporting the government and rebels respectively. One 
account for the cause of the ongoing conflict highlights the inability of the government to 
honour the terms of its socio-economic contract with the Yemeni citizens following the ouster 
of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Thirdly, the damaging impact of the persistent attacks by the 
terrorist group, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, is felt in neighbouring nations in particular 
Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Fourthly, externalities of the Syrian conflict have given birth to a 
very powerful Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that is having substantial 
geopolitical effects throughout the world. A few of the most notable examples include (i) 
4 
 
hostage crisis and shooting in Sydney-Australia in December 2014; (ii) Verviers-Belgium 
attacks that were foiled in January 2015; (iii) ‘Charlie Hebdo’ shooting in Paris-France of 
January 2015 which killed 12 people and injured 11 others, (iv) the series of coordinated mass 
shootings and a suicide in November 2015 in Paris-France in which the attackers killed 130 
people including 90 at the Bataclan theatre with another 413 people injured.  
In light of the above, there has been an evolving academic focus on the effectiveness 
of the various tools with which domestic, transnational and global terrorisms have been  
tackled. For example,  studies documenting the strategies with which the scourge of terrorism 
could be fought include: transparency (internal and external) (Bell et al., 2014); education by 
means of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010); press 
freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013); education (Brockhoff et al., 2015); the 
assessment of behaviours towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and military mechanisms 
(Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). Lines of inquiry focusing on regional specific assessments (like 
Africa) have included: the role of lifelong learning on political stability/non-violence (Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016b); the fight against corruption being the most effective instrument in the 
battle against conflicts and crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016) and geopolitical 
movements as the primary characteristic explaining the changing sub-Saharan African 
warfare landscape  (Straus, 2012).  
Drawing from the above narratives on (i) the need for growth in poverty mitigation 
and (ii) the importance of fighting terrorism in order to create an enabling environment for 
economic growth, this paper assesses how the potentially negative effects of terrorism on 
economic growth can be mitigated with foreign aid, conditional on initial levels of the growth 
of output. Before we discuss how these objectives contribute to existing literature, it is 
important to clearly articulate how the positioning steers clear of discussions in the previous 
studies. To this effect, we largely involve those articles that addressed a similar line of 
inquiry. The strand of the literature that fits closest into this narrative is that which has been 
devoted to investigating relationships among, terrorism, conflicts, political stability and macro 
economic variables. As far as we know, the available studies have focused on: the effect of 
terrorism on foreign direct investment (FDI) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008), the impact of 
terrorism on innovation (Koh, 2007), dynamics of resource-wealth in conflict management 
(Humphreys, 2005), linkages between terrorists activities and economic growth (Meierrieks & 
Gries, 2013; Choi, 2015) and the role of foreign aid in dampening the negative impact of 
terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). The last-two stream of 
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studies is closest to the present line of inquiry, notably: the instrumentality of foreign aid in 
reducing the impact of terrorism on macroeconomic variables.  
To the best of our knowledge, available studies that have been devoted to the 
relationship between terrorism and macroeconomic variables can be categorised into three 
main strands, notably: causality trickling to economic growth from terrorism, the impact of 
economic growth on terrorism and bidirectional causalities between growth and terrorism. 
The first strand embodies three main studies. (1) Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) which 
investigated the effects terrorism and conflicts on the growth of per capita income in Asia for 
the period 1970-2004 to establish that transnational terrorist’ attacks weakened growth 
substantially, by decreasing government expenditure. According to the conclusions, an 
additional terrorism incident per million people reduced per capita domestic growth by about 
1.5 percent. Compared with the more advanced nations, this unappealing impact of terrorism 
is more pronounced in less developed countries, which cannot tackle the damaging 
consequences of terrorism without significant adverse economic outcomes. In addition, the 
negative impact of internal conflicts is twice as high for transnational terrorists’ incidents. (2) 
The effect of terrorism on economic growth across several provinces in Turkey was 
investigated by Öcal and Yildirim  (2010) for the period 1987 to 2001. They concluded that 
the two variables are negatively correlated, with the adverse effect more pronounced for the 
Eastern and South Eastern regions compared to the Western provinces. (3) The relationship 
between terrorism and economic growth was examined by Meierrieks and Gries (2013) for a 
panel of 160 nations with data from 1970 to 2007. The authors confirmed a relationship that is 
heterogeneous across time and space. For instance, in the Cold war era, growth was found to 
have swayed terrorists’ activities in countries with intermediate development levels that 
witnessed terrorism and political instability in Latin America. By contrast, in the post-‘Cold 
war’ era, terrorists’ activities have been found to exert more negative economic consequences 
in African and Islamic countries. This was particularly noticeable in those countries with: (i) 
high levels of political openness and instability and (ii) experiences of escalating terrorism. 
Two main studies constitute the second strand. (1) The effect of terrorism on several 
economic variables has been assessed by Piazza (2006), namely on: poverty, inflation, 
inequality, economic performance, malnutrition, as well as political and demographic control 
indicators. Multiple regressions are performed on 96 nations for the 1986-2012 period. 
Findings show that, as opposed to the mainstream consensus, the relationships between 
economic development indicators and terrorism are not significant. However, variables like 
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the ‘structure of party politics’, population, ‘ethno-religious diversity’ and ‘increase state 
repressions’ are established to be significant determinants. The author concluded that the 
‘social cleavage theory’ is more exogenous to terrorism compared to theories advancing that 
terrorism is the result of poor economic performance. (2) The issue of whether economic 
growth dampens terrorism was investigated by Choi (2015). The author measured terrorism 
(economic growth) in terms of domestic, suicide and international indicators (agricultural and 
industrial sectors). The study proposed a modified theory of hard targets to assess if wealthy 
industrial countries with relatively poor agricultural productivity are more likely to witness 
suicide attacks. The empirical evidence which is based on a panel of 127 countries for the 
1970-2007 period confirmed that countries that enjoy higher levels of industrial growth are 
less likely to witness domestic and international terrorist attacks, but more prone to suicides. 
.The results show that economic development is not an entire cure for terrorism though it is 
effective in mitigating terrorism because the reported suicide attacks were observed largely in 
a few countries.  
The third strand which focuses on bidirectional causalities between terrorism and 
economic growth is articulated by three main studies. (1) The causality between economic 
growth and terrorism was examined by Gries et al. (2011) in seven Western European 
countries. Whereas from a bivariate perspective, the impact of economic performance on 
domestic terrorism is substantial, within a trivariate framework, the influence of economic 
performance on domestic terrorism decreases. The results show that, in three of the seven 
countries investigated, economic performance caused terrorism actions whereas, no 
significant evidence of causality was found to flow from terrorism to economic growth within 
trivariate and bivariate perspectives. (2) The causal relationship between terrorism and 
economic growth was investigated by Shahbaz et al. (2013) for the period 1973-2010, in 
Pakistan. The authors employed capital and trade openness in a production function to 
conclude that: (i) economic growth Granger causes terrorism; (ii) there is a feedback effect 
between terrorism and trade openness and (iii) the relationship between terrorism and capital 
is bidirectional. (3) Co-integration and causal relationships among economic growth, FDI and 
terrorism have been assessed by Shahzad et al. (2015) in Pakistan using quarterly data for the 
period 1988-2010. Two sub-samples are employed, namely: pre-‘9/11’(1988-2001) and post-
‘9/11’(2002-2010) samples.  The results reveal a long-run cointegration among FDI, terrorism 
and economic growth. Findings of Granger causality show bidirectional short- and long-term 
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causalities between economic growth and FDI for both sub-samples. In addition, terrorism is 
found to have a negative impact on FDI.  
The above literature leaves space for improvement in at least three dimensions, 
notably the: need for exploring more dynamics of terrorism, relevance of growth 
conditionalities and role of foreign aid as modifying policy variable. First, consistent with 
Choi (2015), it is appropriate to use a multitude of variables when assessing the relationship 
between growth and terrorism. This is primarily because the author established that the 
influence of a plethora of political violence and conflict indicators varied considerably over  
time and space. Therefore, we follow Efobi et al. (2015) by employing four terrorism 
indicators. They are: transnational, domestic, unclear and total terrorisms. Second, 
conditioning the investigated interconnections on growth levels is important because blanket 
policies in boosting economic growth may not be effective unless they are contingent on 
initial growth levels and tailored differently across high-growth and low-growth nations. 
Consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Öcal and Yildirim  (2010), the impact of 
terrorism on economic growth is contingent on cross-regional growth levels. We employ a 
quantile regression technique that is consistent with this contribution because, it enables an 
assessment of the determinants of a dependent variable throughout the conditional 
distributions of the dependent variable. Third, drawing from the evidence that the 
consequences of terrorism are global, we further condition the analysis with a modifying 
foreign aid policy variable. Such enables the assessment of how development assistance can 
be used to dampen the potentially negative impact of terrorism on economic growth. This 
third contribution informs policy on the appropriate levels of bilateral and multilateral aid 
essential for achieving the underlying research objectives. The motivation for using foreign 
aid as a moderating variable is consistent with a recent stream of terrorism literature on the 
use of development assistance to: (i) mitigate the impact of terrorism on FDI  
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014) and (ii) alleviate the potentially damaging effect of terrorism on 
FDI conditional on existing corruption-control levels in recipient nations  (Efobi et al., 2015).   
 Drawing from the above narratives, the present line of inquiry assesses how 
development assistance could be employed to mitigate the possibly damaging effects of 
terrorism on economic growth, using a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-
2008. The scope of the study is on developing nations because: (i) Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2009) have established that negative impacts of terrorist activities are more pronounced in 
developing nations relative to their developed counterparts. These high income countries have 
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been shown to withstand terrorism without experiencing substantial disruptions in their 
economy and (ii) foreign aid is donated by developed countries to their less developed 
counterparts.  
 We briefly discuss the theoretical underpinnings on which our line of inquiry is based. 
According to Akinwale (2010, p. 125), studies focusing on the resolution of terrorism and 
conflicts have been considerably based on the Conflict Management Model put forward by 
Thomas-Kilman and the Social Control Theory Model from Black. On the one hand, with 
regard to the latter, the connections among groups, individuals and organisations influence the 
exercise of one of the five fundamental mechanisms of social control, notably: avoidance, 
negotiation, settlement, self-help and tolerance. On the other, the former have advanced 
strategic intentions that can very probably surround a two-factor matrix (of cooperation and 
assertiveness) which when combined with collaboration, induces five main conflict 
management styles. These are: competition, avoidance, accommodation, collaboration and 
compromise. The account of Akinwale is in accordance with the literature on conflict 
management, among others: Volkema and Bergmann (1995), Borg (1992), Black (1990) and 
Thomas (1992).  
The highlighted theoretical foundations are in line with the focus of the current study 
in the view that, foreign aid which is employed as the policy variable is intuitively designed to 
capture our hypothesised conditions of conflicts management and social control. In principle, 
development assistance is intuitively expected to facilitate, inter alia: compliance with the rule 
of law, enhance education, encourage social responsibility and increase government 
expenditure in recipient countries. Accordingly, as we have noted earlier, Gaibulloev and 
Sandler (2009) confirmed that terrorism has the potential for lessening economic growth by 
crowding-out government expenditure. For brevity and lack of space, we invite the interested 
reader to find more insights from the vast literature on the positive effects of the other factors 
(including education, respect for the rule of law and social responsibility) on political stability 
and non-violence (Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008ab; Oreopoulos & 
Salvanes, 2009; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b, 2015). For instance, Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2015) had concluded that foreign aid improves education and lifelong-learning 
and in a subsequent study, they established that education and lifelong-learning decrease 
political instability and violence (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). Hence, the testable 
hypothesis of the study is straightforward and clearly stated. It is that development assistance 
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plays an important role in reducing a possibly damaging impact of terrorism on economic 
growth. 
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are discussed in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes with recommendations for policies and direction for future research. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 In accordance with the underlying literature (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 
2015; Asongu, 2015a), we investigate a panel of 781 developing nations with data for the 
period 1984-2008 that is composed of three-year non-overlapping intervals. Hence, all the 
variables are three-year data averages. The choice of periodicity and sample size are based on: 
(i) foreign aid data availability, (ii) constraints on the other variables that enter into the 
empirical specifications and (iii) the need to compare results with studies in the literature that 
have employed the same periodicity. On the second point, the starting year is 1984 because 
institutional indicators from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset are 
available only from that year, while with regard to the third point, the interest of 2008 as the 
ending year is to enable some comparison with previous studies, in the same strand, notably: 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu (2015a).  
 While, the dependent variable is the GDP growth rate, the main independent variable 
involves four terrorism dynamics. They are: domestic, unclear, transnational and total 
terrorisms. Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-
national actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Collectively, these terrorism variables capture the number of yearly 
incidents registered in a country. In order to prevent mathematical concerns relating to log-
transforming zeros on the one hand and correcting for the positive skewness in the dataset, the 
                                                          
1
 The sample includes the following developing countries: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El 
Salvador, Kenya, Panama, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, 
Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, 
Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, 
Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and 
Sudan”. 
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study takes the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents by adding one to the base. This 
transformation approach is consistent with recent literature (Choi & Salehyan, 2013; 
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu et al., 2018a, 2018b; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018). 
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism 
“includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”. Unclear terrorism is 
that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and 
unclear terrorisms.  
Two foreign aid modifying variables are employed in the interactive regressions: 
bilateral and multilateral aids. The control variables are: infrastructure, trade openness, 
inflation, political globalisation, exchange rate and internal conflicts. These control variables 
have been substantially documented in the economic growth literature (Klobodu & Adams, 
2016; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2017; Alagidede & Muazu, 2018; Kumi et al., 2017; Assefa & 
Mollick, 2017). The adopted variables which are also in accordance with Efobi et al. (2015) 
and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) are defined in Table 1. We expect ‘increasing exchange 
rate’, ‘trade openness’ and ‘infrastructural development’ to positively affect economic 
growth, whereas, the effect of inflation and civil/internal conflicts should be negative. The 
impact of political globalisation is mixed and cannot be established beforehand because, 
globalisation has been found to exert both negative and positive impacts, contingent on the 
leverage a country has in ‘decision making’ processes at the international level (Asongu, 
2014a). Consistent with Rodrik (2008), high exchange rates are positive to economic growth, 
with the effect more apparent in developing nations. Infrastructural development and trade 
openness have been substantially documented to boost economic growth (Asongu, 2015a).  
Naturally, we expect high inflation to mitigate economic growth prospects due to, inter alia: 
(i) decreasing investment because of a negative economic outlook and (ii) falling 
consumption from a reducing purchasing power. From intuition, civil or internal conflicts 
should not be favourable for economic growth. For the purpose of standardization and 
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comparability, with the exception of the index of internal civil conflicts, all the predictors of 
the outcome variables are log-normalized. This is summarized in Appendix 1.   
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables employed in the study. Some of 
the indicators are defined in logarithm terms in order to facilitate the comparison of mean 
values. We also notice that there is a substantial variation in the indictors, meaning that, we 
can be confident that significant estimated relationships would emerge. Table 3 informs us on 
the potential issues of overparameterization and multicollinearity. These are highlighted in 
bold. As expected, foreign aid and terrorism variables are highly correlated among 
themselves, respectively. Therefore, we avoid using more than two terrorism or foreign aid 
variables in the same specification. We also notice that the dependent variable is negatively 
(positively) correlated with the terrorism (foreign aid). Hence, our motivation to investigate 
the effectiveness of foreign aid in dampening the potentially damaging effect of terrorism on 
GDP growth is based on solid theoretical grounds.  
 
“Insert Table 2 here” 
 
“Insert Table 3 here” 
 
2. 2. Methodology 
In accordance with the underlying literature on conditional determinants (Billger & 
Goel, 2009; Asongu, 2013a), we employ a quantile regression (QR) approach in order to 
investigate if existing levels in economic growth affect the relationship between terrorist 
incidents and/or foreign aid on growth in developing countries. It involves an evaluation of 
the impact of selected determinants throughout the distribution of economic growth (Keonker 
& Hallock, 2001; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018). 
By contrast, previous studies (see for example Asongu 2015a) focused on parameters 
estimated at the conditional mean of on economic growth. While conditional mean effects are 
worthwhile in certain cases, we extend the work carried out in these earlier studies  by using 
QR to distinguish between the impacts of initial levels of economic growth throughout the 
distribution. For instance, whereas Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumes that economic 
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growth and error terms are distributed normally, the QR approach is not based on the same 
normally distributed residuals. Therefore, the techinque enables us to assess the effect of 
terrorism on economic growth with particular emphasis on best- and worst-performing nations 
in terms of economic growth in developing nations. In essence, with QR, parameter estimates 
are derived at multiple points of the conditional distributions of economic growth (Koenker & 
Bassett, 1978). The QR technique is increasingly being employed in development literature, 
inter alia: corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) and health studies 
(Asongu, 2014b).  
The  th quantile estimator of economic growth is obtained by solving for the 
following optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the 
purpose of simplicity and ease of presentation.   
    

  
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
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k
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i
xyii
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R
xyxy
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)1(min
  ,                                           (1) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised for 
various quantiles such as the 25th or 75th (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of economic growth or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of GDP growth. For the model in Eq. (2) the 
dependent variable iy  is the GDP growth indicator while ix  contains a constant term, trade, 
inflation, infrastructure, exchange rate, political globalisation and civil/internal conflicts.  
The specifications in Eq. (1) are tailored to mitigate the multicollinearity and 
overparameterization issues identified in Table 3. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3. 1 Presentation of results  
Tables 4 and 5 present empirical findings corresponding to bilateral aid and 
multilateral aid respectively. Both tables are sub-divided into two panels. While Panel A 
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presents results for domestic and transnational terrorism, Panel B shows the findings of 
unclear and total terrorisms. Consistent with the discussion in the motivation of the study, the 
 baseline specification is grounded on OLS in order to emphasise the differences in our 
modelling techniques when a distinction is made between the mean and conditional values of 
GDP growth. The superiority of using QR is consistently evident from the disparities in 
significance and magnitude of estimated coefficients between the OLS and QR findings. In 
line with Brambor et al. (2006), the overall impact of the modulating foreign aid variable on 
the investigated relationship is examined in terms of marginal impacts.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 4 on the associations among 
GDP growth, bilateral aid and terrorism. First, the effect of domestic terrorism on GDP 
growth is marginally significant at the median while the impact of ‘transnational terrorism’ is 
not. In Panel B, ‘unclear terrorism’ mitigates economic growth only in the bottom quantiles of 
the distribution while ‘total terrorism’ has a positive effect at the median point. Second, the 
effect of foreign aid on the dependent variable is positive in a wave-like pattern: initially 
increasing, then decreasing and later increasing from the bottom to the top quantiles of the 
distributions. This pattern is consistent with the Left-Hand-Side (LHS) and Right-Hand-Side 
(RHS) of both panels.  
Third, contrary to the intuition motivating our study, the interaction between foreign 
aid and terrorism does not increase economic growth as expected. By contrast, we found that, 
in quantiles where terrorism is shown to increase (decrease) economic growth, its interaction 
with foreign aid decreases (increases) economic growth. Hence; (i) on the LHS of Panel A for 
‘domestic terrorism and bilateral trade’, result for the median are in conflict to our original 
perception and (ii) on the RHS of Panel B, for ‘total terrorism and bilateral aid’, the findings 
of the median are also in contrast to our proposition. Fortunately, on the LHS of Panel B, for 
‘unclear terrorism and bilateral aid’, the results are in line with our expectations at the 25th 
quantile. The thresholds of the modifying bilateral aid are within the range of ‘0.765 to 8.362’ 
provided by the summary statistics for all three cases, respectively: (i) 5.4 (0.027/0.005) for 
the negative marginal effect, (ii) 4.6 (0.023/0.005) for a negative marginal effect and (iii) 7.13 
(0.164/0.023) for a positive marginal effect. It follows that relatively higher levels of bilateral 
aid are needed to reverse the adverse effect of unclear terrorism on economic growth, as 
opposed to the quantity needed to reverse the positive impact of domestic and total terrorisms 
on growth. 
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Fourth, one net positive effect and two negative net negative effects are apparent. 
Accordingly, the net effect of bilateral aid on the effect of domestic terrorism on growth is 
0.0015 in the median while the corresponding net effects with unclear terrorism and total 
terrorism are -0.0448 and -0.0029 in that order.  For example, in the fifth column of Panel A 
in Table 4, the net effect on GDP growth from the interaction between domestic terrorism and 
bilateral aid is 0.0015 ([-0.005× 5.181] + 0.0274).  Where, the mean value of bilateral aid is 
5.181, the unconditional impact of domestic terrorism is 0.0274 while the conditional impact 
from the interaction between domestic terrorism and bilateral aid is -0.005. 
 The statistical significant control variables have the expected signs for the most part. 
(1) Trade has a positive effect, with some evidence of increasing threshold in the RHS of 
Panel A. (2) Infrastructure has a positive effect on growth with a: (i) positive threshold effect 
in the RHS of Panel A and (ii) U-shape in Panel B. (3) As expected the exchange rate and 
political globalisation have positive effects while inflation has a negative impact. (4) The 
unexpected positive effect of internal/civil conflicts is consistent with the impact of terrorism 
on growth.  
 
“Insert Table 4 here” 
 
Four key  findings can be confirmed from Table 5 on the relationships among GDP 
growth, multilateral aid and terrorism dynamics. First, but for the positive effect of 
transnational terrorism on the RHS of Panel A (in the 10th and 90th quantiles), other terrorism 
dynamics have negative effects in bottoms quantiles of GDP growth distributions. Second, the 
effect of foreign aid is consistently positive with a Kuznets shape: increasing from the 10th to 
the 25th quantiles, and then consistently decreasing to the 75th quantile.  
Third, contrary to the intuition motivating our study, the interaction between foreign 
aid and terrorism does not exclusively increase economic growth as expected. As with the 
outcomes in Table 4 we found that, in quantiles where terrorism is reported to increase 
(decrease) economic growth, its interaction with foreign aid decreases (increases) economic 
growth. Hence; (i) on the RHS of Panel A for ‘transnational terrorism and multilateral aid’, 
results at the 10th quantile are contradict  our proposition while (ii) on the LHS for ‘domestic 
terrorism and multilateral aid’ of the 10th quantile are consistent with our original perception. 
Moreover, in Panel B the findings are also in accordance with intuition, notably in: (iii) 
interactions at the median point on the LHS of the panel for ‘unclear terrorism and 
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multilateral aid’ are in accordance with our expectations and with the estimates at the 10th 
quantile on the RHS of the panel for ‘total terrorism and multilateral aid’. Unfortunately, only 
two thresholds of the moderating multilateral aid are within the range of ‘-1.249 to 7.105’ 
provided by the summary statistics for all four cases. They are respectively: (i) 1.95 
(0.135/0.069) for the negative marginal effect on the RHS of Panel A, (ii) 7.25 (0.029/0.004) 
for a positive marginal effect on the LHS of Panel A, (iii) 8.00 (0.136/0.017) for a positive 
marginal effect on the LHS of Panel B and (iv) 7.00 (0.028/0.004) for a positive marginal 
effect on the RHS of Panel B.  Therefore, the modifying threshold of 7.25 and 8.00 for items 
(ii) and (iii) respectively are above the maximum value of multilateral aid which is 7.105. For 
the thresholds that fall within range, we notice that, like in Table 4, relatively higher levels (or 
7.00) of multilateral aid are needed to reverse the negative effect of total terrorism on growth, 
as opposed to the quantity needed to counteract the positive impact of transnational terrorisms 
on economic growth (1.95).  
Fourth, three negative net effects on economic growth are apparent, notably: (i) in the 
10th deciles for the interaction between domestic terrorism and multilateral aid on the one 
hand and the interaction between transnational terrorism and multilateral aid on the other and 
(ii) in the median for the interaction between unclear terrorism and multilateral aid.  
 
“Insert Table 5 here” 
 
The significant control variables have the expected signs for the most part. (1) Trade 
has a positive effect at the medians. (2) Infrastructure has a positive effect on growth with a 
decreasing magnitude from the 25th to the 75th quantiles.  (3) Consistent with our 
expectations, the exchange rate and political globalisation have positive impacts while 
inflation has a negative effect. (4) In accordance with the explanations provided earlier with 
regard to the outcomes in Table 4, the positive effect of internal/civil conflicts on economic 
growth unexpected, but is supported by the argument in the literature on the unpredictable 
impact of terrorism on growth. 
In order to improve the robustness of the empirical exercise, a sensitivity analysis is 
conducted using lagged independent variables. The results are presented in Table 6 and Table 
7 which respectively replicate the regressions in Table 4 and Table 5. The findings from the 
sensitivity analysis are broadly consistent with the findings of Tables 4-5, with the exception 
that, no net effects can be computed because in every specification, at least one estimated 
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coefficient necessary for the computation of a net effect is not significant. However, in the 
section that follows, the further discussion of results and policy implications are based on 
Tables 4-5 because of two main reasons. On the one hand, we are working with three year 
non-overlapping intervals and hence, lagged values are already integrated in the computation 
of the averages. On the other hand, net effects are not apparent in the findings of Tables 6-7 
and the findings of these tables are broadly consistent with those of Tables 4-5 in terms of 
unconditional and conditional impacts of foreign aid and terrorism dynamics.   
 
3.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 Whereas we expected foreign aid to consistently promote economic growth, the 
positive effects of terrorism on economic growth were unexpected.  Evidence of the latter was 
established for two terrorism dynamics (domestic and total) in the regressions on bilateral aid 
and for the corresponding regressions on multilateral aid. Consistent with Asongu (2015a), a 
possible explanation for this unexpected result is that the damaging consequences of some of 
the incidents of terrorism which occurred during the period of study (1984-2008) were 
effectively neutralised by the sampled countries. It is important to note that, the 2014 Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13) showed that terrorists’ activities have substantially 
increased in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. Hence, this unexpected positive impact of 
terrorism is in accordance with the strand of literature documenting that the damaging 
consequences of terrorism could effectively be absorbed by those economies which have 
relatively highly developed infrastructure levels (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009). Nevertheless, 
it is noteworthy that such positive terrorism-growth outcomes are not supported by the results 
obtained by Meierrieks and Gries (2013) and Öcal and Yildirim  (2010). A likely explanation 
for this inconsistency is that, whereas the latter is focused on Turkey exclusively, our study 
distinguishes itself from the former because it embodies both the Cold war and post Cold war 
eras. Such implies that blanket policy initiatives to boost economic growth by tackling 
terrorism around the world should be treated with caution, especially in a periodicity prior to 
the 2011 Arab Spring. 
 A second bone of contention is the unexpected negative impact of the interaction 
between development assistance and terrorism on economic growth. A possible explanation to 
this surprising dynamic could be traced to the political economy of foreign aid. It follows that 
some types of foreign aid initially destined to promote economic growth by fighting terrorism 
may run counter to their intended purposes, especially when the underlying effect of terrorism 
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on growth are not properly understood by foreign donors. For instance, we found that in 
situations where these interactions exhibited a negative effect on economic growth, the 
underlying impact on economic growth of terrorism per se is positive. This finding is 
consistent with the narrative by Eubank (2012) and Asongu (2015b) that over-reliance on 
foreign aid could induce more political instability in the beneficiary developing countries. As 
a policy implication, it is important to understand the initial effect of terrorism on economic 
growth before deploying foreign aid to mitigating a ‘potentially negative’ impact of terrorist 
incidents on economic growth.  
 The impact of foreign aid on economic growth has shown different tendencies: with 
bilateral aid displaying a wave-like pattern, while multilateral aid consistently decreases from 
the 25th to the 75th quantiles after a surge from the 10th quantile to the 25th quantile. It follows 
that the allocation of bilateral aid may not be contingent on initial economic growth levels as 
compared to multilateral aid, which decreases with economic development in recipient 
countries. A possible explanation of this difference is that, bilateral aid has more ‘political 
economy’ strings attached compared to multilateral aid. Accordingly, it is logical to infer that 
bilateral aid has more conditions attached because it involves two parties and agreements on 
the nature of the restrictions could easily be reached. This may not be the case with 
multilateral aid that involves multiple donors with potentially conflicting interests at play. 
While recent survey literature has found no reliable evidence on the effectiveness of 
multilateral aid vis-à-vis bilateral aid in the development outcomes of recipient nations 
(Biscaye et al., 2015), what is important to note is that our findings are logically consistent 
with the widely accepted view that the provision of bilateral aid by former colonial powers to 
their former colonies is primarily to preserve some strategic interests and colonial legacies. 
Moreover, conflicting strategic interests of multilateral donors may indulge them to allocate 
aid on development outcomes. This interpretation is in conformity with Asongu (2014c), “Aid 
is the outcome of bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid 
bureaucracies, multilateral aid agencies and recipient government officials. Indeed donors 
pursue multiple goals and these vary over time. For instance, economic gains seem important 
in Japanese aid, global welfare improvement in Nordic aid and political goals in French aid. 
Hence, few would object to the inference that our findings may also be explained by a 
motivation of the French to maintain their colonial legacies and influence in Africa” (p. 472).  
Overall, our findings of a positive effect of development assistance on economic 
growth are at odds with a recent strand of literature which questions the economics of 
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development assistance. They include: Marglin (2013), Wamboye et al. (2013), Titumir and  
Kamal (2013), Banuri (2013),  Ghosh (2013), Krause (2013), Monni and Spaventa (2013), 
Amin (2013), Obeng-Odoom (2013) and Quartey and Afful-Mensah (2014). Conversely, the 
estimated positive effect: (i) confirms the stream of literature on the clarification of the 
questionable economics of development assistance (Asongu, 2014d) and (ii) the positive 
rewards of foreign aid on economic growth (Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2014; Kargbo & 
Sen, 2014), especially when channelled via educational mechanisms (Asiedu & Nandwa, 
2007; Asiedu, 2014). Accordingly the second point (ii) is important because, as we have seen 
above, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) concluded that foreign aid improves education and 
lifelong-learning and in a latter study, they established that education and lifelong-learning 
decrease political instability and violence (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), which are 
positively associated with terrorist activities.  
We now devote some space to discussing how the findings relate to a specific strand 
of the literature on the use of foreign aid to mitigate the negative effect of terrorism on 
development outcomes. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015) used FDI as the 
development outcome whereas Asongu (2015a) employed the GDP growth rate as in the 
present study. The fact that the empirical evidence in these three studies is based on the same 
sample and periodicity facilitates a comparative assessment of the findings in our present line 
of inquiry. Our findings have only partially confirmed the conclusions of the stream on FDI, 
which broadly sustains that foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. With 
regard to the study on GDP growth, our results: (i) confirm the position that, the magnitude of 
the role of foreign aid in stimulating growth is substantially higher than the positive or 
negative effects of terrorism on growth; (ii) only partially validate the unexpected 
consequences of the interaction between terrorism and aid in inducing a damaging impact on 
economic growth; (iii) do not reliably confirm the results that the favourable impact of aid on 
economic growth is higher in nations with above-median average because, while the patterns 
are wave-like for bilateral aid across the growth distributions, they consistently display an 
increasing magnitude from the 25th to the 75th quantiles, with respect to multilateral aid; (iv) 
partially established the position that the effect of multilateral aid is insignificant in above-
median GDP growth nations because, we have demonstrated that it is consistently 
insignificant at the 90th quantile of the growth distributions and (v) partly confirm the position 
that the effect of unclear terrorism is negative and that above-average multilateral aid can be 
employed to reverse this destructive effect. We reported that while the growth damaging 
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impact of unclear terrorism is persistent across the various quantiles, the threshold of 
multilateral aid required to reverse this negative impact is outside the range observed for our 
sample of study. By contrast, the bilateral aid threshold required to reverse the adverse 
consequences of unclear terrorism is within range. It is important to note that this study steers 
clear of Asongu (2015a) on methodological and conditional specification grounds. The 
previous Asongu (2015a) study employed the: (i) Generalised Methods of Moments with 
forward orthogonal deviations and (ii) GDP growth median as the conditional cut-off for two 
comparative sub-samples.  
 
4. Conclusion and further research directions 
In this study, we have investigated the role of development assistance in reducing a 
hypothetically negative impact of terrorism on economic growth, using a panel of 78 
developing nations with data for the period 1984-2008. The empirical evidence is based on 
interactive Quantile regressions. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism 
dynamics are employed while development assistance consists of: bilateral and multilateral 
aid variables. The following findings are established. First for bilateral aid: (i) the effect on 
GDP growth of domestic and transnational terrorism is insignificant at the median quantile. 
Unclear terrorism mitigate economic growth in bottom quantiles of the distribution while total 
terrorism has a positive effect at the median and (ii) the effect of foreign aid on the economic 
growth is positive with a wave-like pattern: increasing, decreasing and increasing again from 
the bottom to the top quantiles of the distributions. Second, with regard to multilateral aid: (i), 
with the exception of the positive effect of transnational terrorism in the 10th and 90th 
quantiles, other terrorism dynamics have negative effects in bottoms quantiles of GDP growth 
distributions and (ii) the effect of foreign aid is persistently positive with a Kuznets shape: 
increasing from the 10th to the 25th quantile, then consistently decreasing to the 75th quantile. 
Third, for both types of aid, contrary to the intuition motivating our study, the interaction 
between foreign aid and terrorism does not reliably increase economic growth as expected. 
With regard to the investigated hypothesis, we have consistently established that in 
quantiles where terrorism is found to increase (decrease) economic growth, its interaction 
with foreign aid decreases (increases) economic growth. First, the interactions of (i) 
‘domestic terrorism and bilateral aid’, and (ii) ‘total terrorism and bilateral aid’, at the 
medians reject the hypothesis, while (iii) the nexus between ‘unclear terrorism and bilateral 
aid’, at the 25th quantile confirm the hypothesis. Second, the interactions of: (i) ‘transnational 
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terrorism and multilateral aid’ at the 10th quantile do not validate the hypothesis while (ii) 
‘domestic terrorism and multilateral aid’ at the 10th quantile (iii) ‘unclear terrorism and 
multilateral aid’ at the median and (iv) ‘total terrorism and multilateral aid’ at the 10th quantile 
certify the hypothesis. Unfortunately, thresholds of the modifying multilateral aid in the 
second (ii) and third (iii) cases are not within the range observed for our countries during the 
period of study. Comparing thresholds of the moderating aid variables for which the 
hypothesis is either rejected or accepted reveals that relatively higher levels of multilateral 
(bilateral) aid are needed to reverse the negative effect of total (unclear) terrorism on growth, 
as opposed to the quantity needed to reverse the positive impact of transnational (domestic 
and total) terrorism(s) on growth. 
Whereas some tendencies in (i) the impact of terrorism on growth and (ii) the effect of 
the ‘interaction between aid dynamics and terrorism on economic growth’ are contrary to 
what we expected, we cannot be blamed for carrying out the research since, our intuitions 
have been sound from a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients. Accordingly, 
the initial correlation coefficients between the independent variables of interest and growth 
have been consistent with our hypothetical framework, notably: a positive (negative) nexus 
between GDP growth and foreign aid (terrorism). The partial evidence of the positive effect of 
terrorism on growth confirms the widely held caution in econometrics, in which correlations 
should not be extrapolated to causalities.  
The scant evidence of positive net effects is consistent with recent terrorism literature 
on the role of foreign in reducing the effects of terrorism on trade (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2017b) on the one hand and on the other hand, the mixed impacts of net effects are also in 
accordance with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016c). Overall the findings broadly indicate that 
foreign aid is a necessary but not a sufficient policy tool for completely dampening the effects 
of terrorism on economic growth.  
As we noted in the motivation, data and discussion of results sections, the data used in 
this study was shared with us by Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014). Hence, we have investigated 
the problem statement of Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) within an economic growth context 
while using an estimation approach that takes initial levels of economic growth into account. 
Instead of putting the puzzling results in a file drawer and contributing to publication bias in 
scientific literature, we have offered some explanations to them. 
Understanding the channels via which terrorism positively impacts growth is an 
interesting future line of inquiry. In the same light, future studies could also be positioned on 
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clarifying why and how terrorism may interact with foreign aid to exert a negative effect on 
economic growth. It would also be motivating to position a study on a post-2011 sample to 
assess how recent terrorism trends documented by the GTI (2014, p. 13) play-out in the 
underlying interconnections. Last but not the least, consistent with the literature review 
(Asiedu & Nandwa, 2007; Johnson & Quartery, 2009; Asiedu, 2014:  Asongu, 2014c), it 
would be worthwhile to examine the role the modifying policy variable by further 
decomposing aid into more categories. Another future research direction worth pursuing is to 
investigate whether the established linkages withstand empirical scrutiny when annual data is 
used while controlling for country heterogeneity. This builds on the caveat that the use of data 
averages mitigates the effect of some heterogeneity that could influence the findings.  It is 
important to note that this analysis uses panel data based on pooled regression. With data of 
annual periodicity, country heterogeneity can be better articulated using fixed or random 
effects regressions. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
   
Trade Openness  LnTrade Ln. of Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Trade Openness (ln) 4.118 0.534 2.519 5.546 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Domestic terrorism (ln) 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism (ln) 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism(ln) 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism(ln) 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
              
GDPg LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter LnPolglob Civcon 
 
1.000 0.089 0.065 -0.236 0.112 0.195 0.178 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 0.117 -0.010 GDPg 
 1.000 0.296 -0.230 0.043 -0.267 -0.289 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 -0.122 -0.299 LnTrade 
  1.000 -0.121 -0.191 -0.376 -0.514 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.268 -0.183 LnTel 
   1.000 -0.284 -0.047 -0.023 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.150 0.185 LnInflation 
    1.000 0.114 0.183 -0.081 -0.001 -0.050 -0.073 0.089 -0.120 LnXrate 
     1.000 0.721 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 0.233 0.259 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 0.167 0.194 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.127 0.428 Domter 
        1.000 0.528 0.785 0.120 0.418 Tranater 
         1.000 0.789 0.072 0.347 Unclter 
          1.000 0.126 0.441 Totter 
           1.000 -0.024 LnPolglob 
            1.000 Civcon 
              
  GDPg: GDP growth rate. LnTrade:  Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  Domter: Number of 
Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total number of terrorism 
incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts. 
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Table 4: GDPg, Bilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: GDP growth  
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -2.393 -12.84** -6.043** -4.433* -0.522 3.051 -12.0*** -4.07*** -6.58*** -6.35*** -11.36*** -17.2*** 
 (0.416) (0.014) (0.031) (0.053) (0.902) (0.527) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) 
Domter 0.018 0.0003 0.009 0.0274** 0.022 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.153) (0.978) (0.442) (0.037) (0.253) (0.953)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.030 -0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.013 0.066 
       (0.614) (0.942) (0.935) (0.910) (0.924) (0.591) 
LnBilaid 0.698*** 0.746***   0.91*** 0.823*** 0.581** 0.751** 0.209* 0.117** 0.150*** 0.150** 0.325* 0.250 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.012) (0.086) (0.022) (0.001) (0.038) (0.064) (0.398) 
Domter × LnBilaid -0.004* -0.002 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005 -0.0002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.075) (0.462) (0.138) (0.016) (0.156) (0.965)       
Tranater × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.012 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.024 
       (0.277) (0.635) (0.842) (0.820) (0.716) (0.312) 
LnTrade 0.489 0.194 0.490 0.713*** 0.513 0.438 2.486*** 0.340*** 0.964*** 1.161*** 2.303*** 4.065*** 
 (0.167) (0.768) (0.129) (0.000) (0.289) (0.434) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInflation -0.293* -0.643** -0.38*** 0.044 0.115 0.220 0.110 -0.031 -0.015 0.021 0.094 0.131 
 (0.060) (0.035) (0.008) (0.640) (0.497) (0.247) (0.317) (0.522) (0.710) (0.717) (0.469) (0.541) 
LnInfrastructure  0.447** 0.739** 0.487*** 0.347** 0.341 0.908*** 0.473*** 0.169** 0.271*** 0.564*** 0.572*** 1.172*** 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.006) (0.023) (0.230) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.053 0.073 0.033 0.048 0.038 0.056 0.066** -0.004 0.026* 0.029 0.083* 0.109 
 (0.328) (0.374) (0.453) (0.183) (0.594) (0.353) (0.041) (0.811) (0.073) (0.182) (0.090) (0.162) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.161 2.207** 0.411 0.102 0.044 -0.810 0.489 0.535*** 0.562*** 0.407 0.573 0.620 
 (0.782) (0.020) (0.448) (0.829) (0.960) (0.421) (0.282) (0.000) (0.003) (0.152) (0.384) (0.548) 
Civil Conflicts  0.077 0.121 0.189** 0.141* 0.103 0.002 0.139 0.051* -0.017 -0.025 0.085 0.399** 
 (0.435) (0.491) (0.026) (0.056) (0.470) (0.987) (0.155) (0.091) (0.526) (0.554) (0.399) (0.030) 
Net effect na na na 0.0015 na na na na na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.093 0.112 0.077 0.055 0.027 0.046 0.093 0.039 0.095 0.134 0.141 0.194 
Fisher  5.31***      3.30***      
Observations  540 540 540 540 540 540 538 538 538 538 538 538 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -1.790 -11.34** -5.894** -3.497 -1.372 3.241 -2.370 -12.77** -5.85** -4.306* -0.380 3.139 
 (0.544) (0.040) (0.026) (0.195) (0.748) (0.490) (0.420) (0.021) (0.035) (0.054) (0.932) (0.501) 
Unclter  0.033 -0.178* -0.164** 0.039 0.016 0.012 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.782) (0.082) (0.025) (0.736) (0.954) (0.961)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.015 -0.006 0.010 0.023** 0.017 0.001 
       (0.150) (0.606) (0.285) (0023) (0.305) (0.940) 
LnBilaid 0.664*** 0.650** 0.799*** 0.774*** 0.495** 0.741** 0.700*** 0.763*** 0.915*** 0.830*** 0.568** 0.755** 
 (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.019) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.015) 
Unclter × LnBilaid -0.009 0.029 0.023* -0.012 -0.004 -0.002 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.648) (0.117) (0.076) (0.522) (0.921) (0.960)       
Totter × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.003* 0.0001 -0.002* -
0.005*** 
-0.003 -0.0002 
       (0.076) (0.967) (0.090 (0.000) (0.233) (0.945) 
LnTrade 0.482 0.178 0.586* 0.651** 0.781 0.414 0.484 0.289 0.489 0.699*** 0.658 0.421 
 (0.175) (0.785) (0.056) (0.031) (0.110) (0.433) (0.173) (0.671) (0.123) (0.005) (0.196) (0.414) 
LnInflation -0.308* -0.619* -0.355** 0.027 0.095 0.217 -0.295* -0.624* -0.38*** 0.044 0.079 0.216 
 (0.056) (0.071) (0.011) (0.821) (0.570) (0.172) (0.058) (0.057) (0.007) (0.635) (0.656) (0.165) 
LnInfrastructure  0.430** 0.601* 0.501*** 0.392** 0.272 0.904*** 0.447** 0.771** 0.493*** 0.352** 0.289 0.912*** 
 (0.013) (0.082) (0.002) (0.029) (0.334) (0.003) (0.010) (0.025) (0.005) (0.018) (0.327) (0.002) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.056 0.040 0.038 0.055 0.061 0.046 0.053 0.074 0.035 0.047 0.044 0.050 
 (0.295) (0.678) (0.383) (0.202) (0.393) (0.471) (0.323) (0.401) (0.424) (0.184) (0.548) (0.413) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.072 2.028* 0.401 -0.007 0.102 -0.805 0.157 2.047** 0.364 0.078 -0.090 -0.813 
 (0.900) (0.060) (0.425) (0.989) (0.906) (0.440) (0.787) (0.048) (0.499) (0.866) (0.922) (0.431) 
Civil Conflicts  0.037 -0.165 0.093 0.060 0.068 0.002 0.079 0.011 0.192** 0.141* 0.089 0.007 
 (0.678) (0.273) (0.229) (0.463) (0.611) (0.986) (0.420) (0.951) (0.023) (0.053) (0.565) (0.946) 
Net effect na na -0.0448 na na na na na na -0.0029 na na 
             
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.088 0.108 0.076 0.049 0.023 0.046 0.093 0.112 0.077 0.055 0.027 0.046 
Fisher  5.16***      5.29***      
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Observations  540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. 
R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where GDPg is least. na: not applicable 
because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. The mean value of bilateral aid is 
5.181. 
 
Table 5: GDPg, Multilateral aid, Terrorism  
             
 Dependent Variable: GDPg  
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -2.529 -13.74** -4.121 -3.098 -1.222 2.980 -2.410 -15.6*** -3.537 -4.232* -1.623 3.558 
 (0.382) (0.013) (0.235) (0.206) (0.736) (0.654) (0.408) (0.001) (0.301) (0.072) (0.645) (0.565) 
Domter 0.002 -
0.029*** 
-0.013** 0.003 -0.0006 0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.719) (0.000) (0.042) (0.546) (0.956) (0.641)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.044 0.135*** 0.023 0.032 -0.014 0.123** 
       (0.276) (0.002) (0.564) (0.392) (0.800) (0.044) 
LnMulaid 0.631*** 0.711*** 0.794*** 0.658*** 0.419** 0.397 0.649*** 0.750*** 0.829*** 0.684*** 0.421** 0.451 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.239) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.172) 
Domter × LnMulaid -0.002 0.004*** 0.0007 -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.135) (0.007) (0.651) (0.046) (0.545) (0.738)       
Tranater × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.016* -
0.069*** 
-0.027** -0.012 -0.002 -0.028 
       (0.081) (0.000) (0.016) (0.263) (0.871) (0.127) 
LnTrade 0.539 0.311 0.286 0.531* 0.511 0.713 0.594 0.177 0.324 0.773*** 0.605 0.749 
 (0.136) (0.641) (0.457) (0.050) (0.228) (0.345) (0.107) (0.764) (0.387) (0.003) (0.138) (0.279) 
LnInflation -0.332** -0.641** -0.400** -0.066 0.136 -0.053 -0.341** -0.695** -0.403** -0.034 0.167 -0.062 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.025) (0.529) (0.358) (0.821) (0.030) (0.016) (0.020) (0.734) (0.244) (0.775) 
LnInfrastructure  0.545*** 0.602 0.628** 0.515*** 0.502* 0.468 0.537*** 0.734** 0.686*** 0.480*** 0.459* 0.506 
 (0.004) (0.157) (0.013) (0.004) (0.058) (0.307) (0.003) (0.044) (0.006) (0.006) (0.063) (0.228) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.031 -0.058 0.075 0.028 0.059 0.021 0.031 -0.016 0.090* 0.041 0.062 0.032 
 (0.590) (0.545) (0.147) (0.473) (0.356) (0.836) (0.576) (0.849 (0.082) (0.291) (0.312) (0.748) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.377 2.644** 0.434 0.342 0.423 -0.169 0.280 3.13*** 0.197 0.312 0.416 -0.426 
 (0.527) (0.019) (0.533) (0.505) (0.569) (0.912) (0.649) (0.002) (0.775) (0.527) (0.557) (0.764) 
Civil Conflicts  0.121 0.047 0.193* 0.245*** 0.150 0.096 0.081 0.240* 0.194* 0.170** 0.121 0.104 
 (0.206) (0.750) (0.078) (0.002) (0.228) (0.675) (0.332) (0.051) (0.059) (0.027) (0.318) (0.513) 
Net effect na -0.0123 na na na na na -0.1522 na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.097 0.125 0.089 0.056 0.031 0.021 0.094 0.125 0.089 0.054 0.029 0.025 
Fisher 5.94***      5.94***      
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -1.865 -12.92** -2.059 -2.835 -1.139 2.799 -2.446 -13.4*** -4.206 -3.482 -1.499 2.981 
 (0.521) (0.024) (0.510) (0.292) (0.748) (0.645) (0.397) (0.009) (0.251) (0.166) (0.661) (0.656) 
Unclter  -0.046 -0.018 -0.111** -0.136** -0.048 0 .031 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.485) (0.808) (0.034) (0.014) (0.518) (0.598)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 -
0.028*** 
-0.009* 0.003 -0.0008 0.004 
       (0.776) (0..000) (0.098) (0.436) (0.923) (0.629) 
LnMulaid 0.597*** 0.701*** 0.798*** 0.610*** 0.412** 0 .391 0.631*** 0.685*** 0.788*** 0 .665*** 0.414** 0.397 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.207) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.244) 
Unclter × LnMulaid 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.017* 0.004 -0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.708) (0.767) (0.112) (0.095) (0.755) (0.595)       
Totter × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 0.004*** 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 
       (0.150) (0.001) (0.911) (0.175) (0.618) (0.705) 
LnTrade 0.519 0.203 0.169 0.514* 0.565 0 .777 0.533 0.247 0.266 0 .589** 0 .560 0.706 
 (0.154) (0.770) (0.682) (0.084) (0.179) (0.278) (0.143) (0.692) (0.512) (0.035) (0.159) (0.355) 
LnInflation -0.334** -0.707** -0.41*** -0.059 0.188 -0.052 -0.332** -0.653 -0.406** -0.068 0 .170 -0.052 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.000) (0.606) (0.189) (0.810) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.524) (0.223) (0.826) 
LnInfrastructure  0.541*** 0.741* 0.694*** 0.577*** 0.478* 0.455 0.547*** 0 .589 0 .664** 0.509*** 0.474* 0.470 
 (0.004) (0.082) (0.002) (0.003) (0.066) (0.286) (0.004) (0.139) (0.013) (0.005) (0.051) (0.310) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) 0.035 -0.050 0.075 0.034 0.060 0.027 0.032  -0.086 0 .082 0 .032 0.065 0.021 
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 (0.451) (0.616) (0.107) (0.435) (0.330) (0.776) (0.579) (0.339) (0.135) (0.437) (0.271) (0.839) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  0.269 2.488** 0.042 0.312 0.328 -0.170 0 .363 2.678** 0 .462 0 .365 0.434 -0.165 
 (0.645) (0.026) (0.946) (0.578) (0.648) (0.902) (0.542) (0.011) (0.531) (0.487) (0.530) (0.915) 
Civil Conflicts  0.087 0.079 0.049 0.211** 0.102 0 .083 0 .119 0.038 0. 235** 0.155* 0.120 0.096 
 (0.316) (0.619) (0.601) (0.010) (0.365) (0.650) (0.208) (0.795) (0.042) (0.052) (0.305) (0.678) 
Net effect na na na -0.0652 na na na -0.0113 na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.095 0.122 0.092 0.056 0.032 0.0215 0.096 0.124 0.090 0.056 0.031 0.022 
Fisher 5.87***      5.93***      
Observations  536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. GDPg: GDP growth rate. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where GDPg is least. na: not 
applicable because at least one  estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. The mean value of 
multilateral aid is 4.163. 
 
Table 6: GDPg, Bilateral aid, Terrorism (Sensitivity analysis) 
             
 Dependent Variable: GDP growth  
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -1.882 -
13.433** 
-6.664* -2.281 4.445 8.004* -
9.263*** 
-3.043** -
4.989*** 
-
6.235*** 
-9.139** -10.760 
 (0.507) (0.037) (0.093) (0.370) (0.226) (0.092) (0.001) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.118) 
Domter 0.005 -0.007 -0.028 -0.001 0.024 à.008 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.747) (0.849) (0.219) (0.920) (0.249) (0.767)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.060 0.011 0.037 0.029 0.038 0.038 
       (0.304) (0.848) (.0523) (0.691) (0.818) (0.898) 
LnBilaid 0.657*** 0.946 0.656*** 0.525*** 0.485** 0.726*** 0.151 0.083 0.092 0.163* 0.182 0.328 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.012) (0.004) (0.236) (0.244) (0.196) (0.073) (0.364) (0.369) 
Domter × LnBilaid -0.002 -0.0002 0.004 -0.0009 -0.005 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.510) (0.969) (0.307) (0.728) (0.163) (0.729)       
Tranater × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.017 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.019 
       (0.131) (0.700) (0.587) (0.647) (0.701) (0.728) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Net Effects  na na na na na na na na na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.096 0.112 0.060 0.042 0.032 0.056 0.194 0.031 0.082 0.129 0.135 0.186 
Fisher  4.63***      10.22***      
Observations  473 473 473 473 473 473 472 472 472 472 472 472 
             
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -1.264 -
13.474** 
-6.946* -1.907 4.306 7.935* -1.891 -
13.412** 
-6.799* -2.385 4.337 7.138 
 (0.657) (0.040) (0.073) (0.489) (0.229) (0.093) (0.504) (0.038) (0.087) (0.364) (0.248) (0.136) 
Unclter  0.011 -0.287 -0.177 -0.010 -0.040 0.096 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.928) (0.279) (0.259) (0924) (0.781) (0.613)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005 0.008 -0.010 -0.0002 0.001 0.010 
       (0.720) (0.777) (0.576) (0.983) (0.931) (0.623) 
LnBilaid 0.644*** 0.952*** 0.651*** 0.486*** 0.465** 0.702*** 0.661*** 0.988*** 0.641*** 0.526*** 0.480** 0.749*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.015) (0.003) 
Unclter × LnBilaid -0.010 0.048 0.023 -0.002 -0.001 -0.025 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.632) (0.307) (0.392) (0.903) (0.968) (0.454)       
Totter × LnBilaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 -0.002 0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
       (0.458) (0.615) (0.789) (0.646) (0.603) (0.471) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Net effects  na na na na na na na na na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.101 0.113 0.061 0.043 0.040 0.063 0.097 0.112 0.061 0.044 0.034 0.057 
Fisher  5.01***      4.73***      
Observations  473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and Pseudo 
R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where GDPg is least. na: not applicable because at least one  
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. The mean value of bilateral aid is 5.181. 
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Table 7: GDPg, Multilateral aid, Terrorism (Sensitivity analysis) 
             
 Dependent Variable: GDPg    
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 
    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -1.495 -9.697 -3.764 -2.083 2.247 8.162 -1.456 -10.339 -5.354 -1.560 2.463 6.806 
 (0.586) (0.184) (0.335) (0.385) (0.478) (0.177) (0.596) (0.142) (0.163) (0.534) (0.426) (0.220) 
Domter -0.003 -0.025 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.014 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.657) (0.195) (0.779) (0.836) (0.812) (0.379)       
Tranater --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 -0.087 0.058 0.007 -0.013 0.061 
       (0.977) (0.496) (0.409) (0.871) (0.807) (0.544) 
LnMulaid 0.613*** 0.965*** 0.705*** 0.619*** 0.471*** 0.423 0.630*** 0.968*** 0.729*** 0.640*** 0.520*** 0.534* 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.160) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.057) 
Domter × LnMulaid -0.0006 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.004 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.623) (0.479) (0.553) (0.393) (0.778) (0.331)       
Tranater × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.008   0.005 -0.037* -0.018 -0.007 -0.017 
       (0.384) (0.869) (0.059) (0.157) (0.622) (0.550) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Net effects na na na na na na na na na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.095 0.114 0.071 0.054 0.037 0.039 0.093 0.112 0.074 0.052 0.037 0.038 
Fisher 4.17***      4.18***      
Observations  465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism 
             
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 
  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -0.752 -9.766 -3.132 -0.809 2.926 7.535 -1.491 -9.615 -3.802 -1.902 2.682 7.268 
 (0.787) (0.135) (0.480) (0.733) (0.332) (0.222) (0.587) (0.193) (0.343) (0.420) (0.417) (0.213) 
Unclter  -0.107* -0.194 -0.060 -0.078* -0.072 -0.099 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.076) (0.125) (0.410) (0.090) (0.214) (0.405)       
Totter --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.002 -0.023 -0.005 -0.0008 -0.001 0.009 
       (0.617) (0.129) (0.494) (0.873) (0.829) (0.441) 
LnMulaid 0.595*** 0.973 0.711*** 0.643*** 0.466*** 0.316 0.617*** 1.005*** 0.705*** 0.645*** 0.484*** 0.451 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.295) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) 
Unclter × LnMulaid 0.010 0.028 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.270) (0.231) (0.665) (0.454) (0.711) (0.777)       
Totter × LnMulaid --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0006 0.003 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
       (0.524) (0.397) (0.954) (0.285) (0.329) (0.361) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
Net effects na na na na na na na na na na na na 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.108 0.118 0.078 0.063 0.048 0.045 0.097 0.114 0.073 0.057 0.039 0.039 
Fisher 5.02***      4.15***      
Observations  465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS  and 
Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where GDPg is least. na: not applicable because at least one  
estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. The mean value of multilateral aid is 4.163. 
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